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Accelerating the Passage to
Citizenship: Marriage and
Naturalization in France
Haley McAvay1* and Roger Waldinger 2
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Naturalization systems often provide immigrant spouses of citizens with accelerated
access to citizenship, but thus far, the impact of such fast-track procedures has yet to
be examined by empirical analysis. Toward that end, we leverage a unique feature of
French naturalization policy: a dual track system, one for standard naturalization and a
second that makes naturalization a right for non-citizens married to citizens. We show that,
overall, family-level factors exercise the greatest influence on naturalization decisions
relative to individual and contextual factors; further, marriage to French citizens is the
single most powerful factor, yielding effects on naturalization in both tracks. However, while
marriage to a naturalized citizen promotes standard naturalization, marriage to a French
native fosters citizenship via the marriage track. Women migrants who marry French
natives are particularly likely to naturalize via marriage. Contributing to the study of
naturalization by attending to the link between two institutions—naturalization and
marriage—we show that the effects of an apparent bias toward the familial ties of
citizens run up against state efforts to close off membership to outsiders.
Keywords: citizenship, family, naturalization, France, marriage
INTRODUCTION
Recent scholarship on citizenship acquisition has increasingly focused on the micro context in which
the naturalization decision unfolds: the family. Seeking to understand the decline in naturalization
rates in Germany, Street (2014) notes that as family members are interdependent, individuals are
likely to weigh family-level implications when deciding whether to acquire a new citizenship.
Focusing on the Netherlands, Peters et al. (2016) emphasized that naturalization takes place in the
“context of linked lives” (p. 361), tying the decision-making calculus of any one individual to the
interests of other family members. Studying young adults who arrived in the United States as migrant
children, Soehl et al. (2018) proposed an “embedded model of naturalization choice.” Their analysis
complements Street’s, showing that just one variable—whether or not parents naturalized before the
respondent or in the same year—has the single most powerful impact on naturalization.
Thus, family-level decisions can anchor or signal commitment to the country of immigration,
whether by providing more information about the benefits of citizenship or the mechanics of the
process, or by transmitting norms or values about civic membership. Yet not considered by this
research are the institutional factors that also influence family effects on naturalization, as
naturalization is constructed in ways that heighten the relevance of family interdependencies. In
such countries as the United States, Spain, Norway, the Netherlands, France, and Austria, spouses of
citizens enjoy an accelerated track to naturalization, gaining eligibility in a reduced time frame.
Providing the foreign-born spouses of citizens with facilitated passage to citizenship reflects citizens’
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greater claiming capacity, as well as the overall bias animating
family reunification, which values the pursuit of citizens’
happiness. By facilitating naturalization of the foreign-born
spouse, states protect the family life of citizen spouses, who
gain the assurance that they and their spouse can forever
remain on home grounds (Bonjour and Block, 2016). By
privileging marriage to citizens, states also reinforce marriage’s
importance while signaling an intuitive understanding of the
lessons that migration scholarship teaches—that having intimate
ties to citizens fosters integration (Abrams, 2013).
However, these very same procedures weaken states’ ability to
control migrants and migration. Citizenship is a scarce status,
wanted by many, in part because of the migration and mobility
privileges it confers. As long as they lack citizenship, immigrant
residents remain subject to the coercive power of the state, which
can extrude them, prevent them from re-entering if they leave,
and, by requiring them to renew residence permits, subject them
to a type of continuing scrutiny from which citizens escape. As
residence permits (such as lawful permanent residence in the
Unites States) allow for long-term presence but do not provide
the security gained via citizenship, the possibility of hastening the
passage to citizenship by marrying a citizen can be the decisive
influence on the marital decision, as some research suggests
(Masure, 2014).
Naturalization also expands the pool of migrants who would not
otherwise be eligible for entry, such as the parents of a naturalized
spouse or the naturalized spouse’s minor children from a previous
marriage. Furthermore, naturalization can accelerate family
reunification: in some countries, such as the United States, access
to residency rights for the spouses, parents, and minor children of
citizens is a matter of processing delays, as opposed to the years
postponing the arrival of denizens’ wives or husbands (Abrams,
2006). While acquisition of citizenship permanently protects
naturalized immigrants from the threat of deportation, it similarly
leaves them permanently free to benefit from the near-universal
liberalization of divorce, separating from the citizen spouse and
initiating a new, binational marriage, in turn triggering additional
migration (Cole, 2014).
Consequently, procedures that facilitate the naturalization of
citizens’ spouses weaken citizenship’s role as an institution of
social closure. Moreover, as implementing those procedures
activates a tension between two competing state
goals—responding to, and validating, the preferences of
citizens (who are also voters) vs. retaining tighter control over
new entries—naturalization policy on the books and in practice
may diverge. Heightening the possibility that the control
imperative may take priority is awareness that tightened
policies have left marriage as one of the few means of legal
entry, and hence the growing perception that marriage comprises
the weak link in the chain of migration control (Kringelbach,
2013). Not only is marriage inherently difficult to regulate, but the
challenge is heightened by virtue of the fact that its control affects
not only immigrants but citizens as well. Furthermore, as
globalization spurs binational marriage, both via immigration
and via the increasingly common, foreign experiences of citizens,
many binational marriages occur abroad, thereby escaping home
state supervision altogether.
Thus, “state agencies seeking to control and limit migration
have marriage migration in their sights (Williams, 2012: 35).”
Binational marriages increasingly fall under the suspicion that
citizens and foreigners are using marriage instrumentally for
immigration purposes (Beck-Gernsheim, 2007), leading
migration control agencies to cast a dubious look at binational
marriages. US Citizenship and Immigration Services, for
example, reportedly views 20 to 33 percent of marriages
between US citizens and immigrants as fraudulent (Brettell,
2017: 86). Consequently, requiring marriage migrants to
demonstrate the bona fide nature of their relationship has
become a pervasive aspect of migration control. While the
legitimacy of binational marriages is often scrutinized at the
moment of migration, later efforts to secure citizenship may
reactivate those doubts, as indicated by a study of naturalization
practices under the Trump administration, which found that
adjudicators asked more questions about applicants’ marriage
and demanded “more proof in the form of joint tax returns, bank
statements, insurance and bills (Capps and Echeverria-Estrada,
2020:16).” Since officials have ample scope for discretion, the
control imperative might also affect the criteria used to determine
a marriage’s bona fides. Officials may view only certain types of
applicants—by virtue of sex or national origin—or types of citizen
spouses—by virtue of place of birth or parentage–as appropriate
for benefiting from fast-track procedures. Similarly, relationships
that depart from the standard pattern—for example, those
involving a significant age difference between spouses—might
induce additional scrutiny. Moreover, the strategic value of
marriage for the purposes of migration can indeed generate
marriages that might suffer from close examination, as
suggested by the research of Boulahbel-Villac (1995), who
profiled the pattern of younger, urban-origin, and better
educated Algerian women marrying older, less educated,
Algerian-born spouses residing in France. Thus, just as fear
that close examination of one’s personal record might reveal
problems better left hidden deters potential citizens from
applying for naturalization (Gilbertson and Singer, 2003), so
might concern over possibly problematic aspects of a marriage
lead persons technically eligible for the accelerated track to opt for
standard naturalization instead.
In this light, prior research on the familial embeddedness of
naturalization may have overemphasized the importance of
micro-level motivations at the expense of the match between
two institutions—marriage and naturalization. Both marriage
and naturalization bear a certain similarity, in that each entails
a relationship to the state. A feature of many naturalization
systems, the bias in favor of applicants with citizen spouses
adds further incentives to acquire a new citizenship. However,
whether qualifying applicants take advantage of fast-track
procedures is an altogether separate question. Doing so
necessarily puts the bona fides of marriages, as well as the
documentation testifying both to the nature of the relationship
and the identities of the partners, under closer inspection.
Moreover, that heightened scrutiny occurs in a particular
context: an immigration system biased toward exclusion and
against noncitizens; a “securitization of immigration law and
modernization of documentation systems increase(ing) the fear
Frontiers in Sociology | www.frontiersin.org May 2021 | Volume 6 | Article 6593722
McAvay and Waldinger Accelerating the Passage to Citizenship
that documents are fraudulent (Mitchell and Coutin, 2019: 888)”;
and a threshold event—namely, naturalization—making
settlement permanent and foreclosing the possibility of
expulsion.
This study represents the first empirical attempt to understand the
impact of the institutional features of naturalization that, at least on
paper, facilitate the route to citizenship for immigrants with citizen
spouses. We do so by exploiting a distinctive feature of French
naturalization policy. Although numerous countries facilitate the
path to citizenship for the foreign-born spouses of citizens, France
provides them with an altogether separate track. Naturalization by
declaration, a procedure that, for simplicity, we will label
“naturalization by marriage,” makes naturalization a right, thereby
accelerating the process. We draw on the Trajectories and Origins
Survey (TeO), a large, high-quality, representative survey of France’s
foreign-born population, conducted in 2008–2009, which has the
unique feature of distinguishing between these naturalization routes.
Immigrants married to French citizens have much higher rates of
naturalization (62 percent), than those married to foreigners (15
percent) and those without partners (39 percent). But surprisingly,
most spouses of citizens do not naturalize via themarriage track, even
if in principle they are all eligible to do so. Instead, when immigrant
spouses of citizens naturalize, the greatmajority (77 percent) do so via
the more time-consuming standard track, involving numerous
interactions with authorities, during the course of which officials
make an ad hoc assessment of the degree of assimilation.
Thus, going beyond previous research on the influence of
family-level factors on naturalization decisions, this article seeks
to illuminate the factors that propel naturalizing citizens onto one
of the two different tracks, thereby gaining insight into the
relationship between immigrants’ characteristics and the
features of the system through which naturalization
applications are processed. Using an event history analysis, we
explore the determinants of naturalization by both tracks. We do
so by considering the three levels on which prior scholarship has
focused: the family level, focusing on factors related to the
parentage of the spouse and the location of respondents’
parents and children; the individual level, focusing on
characteristics such as age at migration, legal entry status, and
education; and the contextual level, focusing on factors linked to
migrants’ countries of origins, which we retrieve from a variety of
data sources andmatch to the TeO survey. Three main aims guide
the analysis: 1) to explore whether naturalization determinants
exert similar effects on both tracks, with a specific focus on
marital status; 2) to assess the relative weight of individual-level,
family-level, and contextual-level variables on naturalization over
time; and 3) to assess whether marital status interacts with
individual and contextual-level variables to put certain
categories of migrants on differential pathways to citizenship.
BACKGROUND
Naturalization in France
As a citizenship system, France, with its history as a jus solis
system, low residency requirements, as-of-right citizenship for
the spouses of French citizens, and acceptance of dual citizenship,
resembles the liberal systems of settler states like the United States
or Canada. Nonetheless, French naturalization rates are among
the lowest in Europe.
Applications for naturalization begin at the prefecture, which
sends accepted dossiers to the Interior Ministry for final
determination. As broad national policies exercise influence at
the Ministry whereas policing takes precedence at the prefecture,
the Ministry decides whether an immigrant is naturalized, but the
prefecture, in controlling the downstream paper flow, determines
whether an immigrant can be a candidate (Spire, 2005).
Starting the process at the prefecture can be a deterrent (Spire,
2005): Applicants for naturalization would have previously
visited the prefecture, often with unpleasant results, to obtain
and renew residence permits (Mazouz, 2017). As everywhere,
foreigners wanting citizenship need to put themselves under the
microscope, which is why compiling a dossier of documents that
fully establishes their identity and traces their trajectory from
birth to the moment of application is an inherent part of the
process. As the prefecture systematically requests reports on
applicants from the police and security services, worries about
a blemish on the record encourage postponement (Mazouz,
2017).
Waiting times are long and documentary requirements are
exacting (Hajjat, 2013), with relevant information tightly
rationed, leaving applicants uncertain about the information
needed. As system attributes, the demanding nature of the
requirements and the insistence on compliance simultaneously
put the applicant to the “test of time”—indirectly testing the
intensity of the applicant’s desire for naturalization—and
signaling to the bureaucrat—via the ease or difficulty entailed
in compiling the proper dossier—the degree of the applicant’s
assimilation (Spire, 2005; Mazouz, 2017). These very same
barriers weigh heavily on the low-skilled (Liebig and von
Haaren, 2011).
Applicants must further satisfy requirements for cultural and
social assimilation. Specified neither by law nor administrative
rules, assimilation is subject to ad hoc interpretation.
International migration entails the internationalization of
families, yet French citizenship law mandates that France be at
the center of the prospective citizen’s familial attachments.
Consequently, agents tend to view applicants with families still
in the homeland as ineligible, even if other criteria are fulfilled. As
of the TeO survey, bureaucrats were charged with assessing
linguistic assimilation yet lacked explicit criteria for
determining needed competence levels. Consequently,
attributes bearing no relationship to language ability often
enter into a sphere where they do not belong, namely,
consideration of an applicants’ degree of linguistic assimilation
(Mazouz, 2017).
Instead of naturalization by decree, foreigners married to
French citizens can follow a different track—naturalization by
declaration, a procedure that makes naturalization a right. Weil
(2002) described naturalization via marriage as largely open,
although noting that 9 percent of the applications received by
the ministry in 2003 were rejected. In reality, this track is
encumbered. The extensive documentation required to
naturalize by decree applies to naturalization by declaration,
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but in amplified form, involving documentation of the French-
born partner’s nationality, two proofs of marriage, a criminal
record summarizing all convictions handed down against the
foreign spouse, an attestation of the continuity of marriage (with
supporting documents), and a full birth certificate (Neyrand and
M’Sili, 1995). Complying with even these basic requirements can
prove problematic. Registry systems in developing countries
remain incomplete: As of the early 2000s, according to
UNICEF, more than a third of births worldwide went
unregistered (Szreter and Breckenridge, 2012). As even the
baseline requirements signal an underlying suspicion—as
indicated by the demand for documents testifying to the
continuity of the couple’s life together after marriage—“dossiers
exclusively containing these required documents are rare. For the
most part, they furnish complementary indications on the situation
of the foreign spouse. One finds, for example, pay statements for
the foreign spouse, work certificates, etc.” (Neyrand and M’Sili,
1995: 48). Despite the demand for proof of continuity of marriage,
the prefect can undertake a “survey ofmorality,” inquiring not only
into the bona fides of the marriage but also examining the degree of
integration of the foreign spouse (as indexed by fluency in French)
as well as the couple’s friendship patterns. Consequently, a
significant measure of administrative discretion hovers over
naturalizations occurring via the marriage track, which is why
rather than escaping from the controls applied to naturalization by
decree “in practice, it [the marriage track] sees itself submitted to
the same criteria . . . as naturalization [by decree] (Masure,
2014: 203).”
The process has also become longer and more difficult over
time. Up until 1993, a foreigner married to a French citizen could
gain French citizenship by visiting the relevant authority (in most
cases, the prefecture) and making a statement of intent to
naturalize; presuming no objections, citizenship would then be
granted after the following year. However, as marriages between
foreigners and French citizens have grown increasingly suspect,
tightening up on binational marriages became has increasingly
been seen as an effective tool of strengthening migration control
consequently, that waiting period was lengthened to 4 years,
where it currently stands.
Last, for purposes of naturalization, the definition of marriage
has deviated from the broader societal pattern. In France, long-
term civil unions are increasingly common, recognized by law
since 1999 as the legal equivalent of marriage; in 2008, only a few
years after the institution of the pacte civil de solidarité, 265,404
marriages were concluded as compared to 137,766 civil unions, a
gap that has narrowed significantly since. Whereas civil
partnerships allow access to residency cards or family
reunification (Sohler and Levy, 2009), only formal marriage
permits spouses of French citizens to take advantage of the
alternative, marriage track toward naturalization.
Family-, Individual-, and Contextual Level
Approaches
Family-Level Approaches
Research on familial influences emphasizes the ways in which the
micro-level environment affects applicants’ motivations, in this
respect building on a hypothesis earlier advanced by Yang (1994),
who suggested that a greater commitment to life in the country of
immigration may arise when both spouses are territorially
present, thereby motivating the quest for citizenship. Similarly,
Street (2014) hypothesized that for immigrant parents, the
decision to naturalize would be heavily affected by the
implications for their children. Thus, when the fate of
immigrant parents and children was decoupled—with German
citizenship attributed at birth to the German-born children of
foreign-born parents, regardless of the latter’s citizenship
status—naturalization among parents declined. Likewise, Soehl
et al. (2018) demonstrated the interdependency of parents’ and
children’s naturalization, yet also showed that the strength of that
relationship diminishes with time, as evidenced by findings that
influences from the parental household subside as children age
and move out on their own.
In these studies, themigration of the core family network has been
completed, with the crucial members in place in the society of
destination. However, co-presence cannot always be presumed, as
emigration often comprises a familial survival strategy, involving the
short-term relocation of a single family member in order to
consolidate income generating opportunities at home. Moreover,
migration’s selectivity, leading younger persons to depart first, with
dependents leaving later, or possibly never at all, ensures that
international migration yields internationalized families.
These cross-border connections are likely to affect both
migrants’ motivations to naturalize and perceptions by officials
evaluating applications. Plans for return migration and
continuing linkages with homeland kin, most importantly,
spouses and children, may fortify homeland loyalties, leading
eligible immigrants to select out of naturalization. Those very
same ties may lead officials to perceive applicants with extensive
transnational connections as unsuitable for citizenship, instead
favoring those with strong family ties in France.
Politics also impinge on the relationship between migration
and marriage, as marriage is a legal act, regulated by the state.
Standard approaches conceptualize reduced social distance
between immigrants and the mainstream as eventuating in
inter-marriage. In turn, the diminished social distance denoted
by marriage to a citizen could simultaneously signal a preference
for citizenship and further generate the competencies needed to
pursue that goal.
Since, as already noted, marriage can open access to both the
territory and to citizenship, marriages between citizens and foreigners
have become increasingly suspect. In France, the category of possibly
dubious marriages has expanded from marriages fraudulently
contracted for the purposes of residence or citizenship (“marriages
blancs”) to marriages in which a foreigner fools a citizen partner into
thinking that the marriage is motivated by love (“marriages gris”).
Consequently, whether the officials reviewing an application perceive
a marriage as suspect or genuine may depend on the characteristics
and history of spouses and their relationship. Any number of
traits—where the couples met, whether in France or abroad;
where and when they married, whether before migration or after;
the rootedness of the citizen spouse, whether naturalized or born in
France; and whether the spouses are similar or different on such key
attributes as age or education—may be enough to raise a red flag.
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Consequently, family-level influences are likely to take varied
form. Marriage to a citizen is likely to deepen the motivation to
naturalize; however, fast-tracking naturalization also puts that
marriage under the microscope, which is why characteristics of
the relationship and of the spouse are likely to impinge on the
route to citizenship. The broader set of family ties—to siblings
and parents—comes into play as well, affecting decisions by both
applicants and officials, with weaker connections to France
possibly casting doubt on the marriage and hence reducing the
likelihood that applicants will opt for the fast track.
Individual-Level Approaches
Family factors should therefore influence naturalization above and
beyond the individual-level characteristics highlighted in prior
literature. Neo-assimilation theory (Alba and Nee, 2003) contends
that immigrants’ needs of survival compel adaptation, yielding skills
that bring progress and exposure to “the mainstream.” In this view,
the process leading to naturalization is one of linear change, with
propensities growing as settlement generates resources. By contrast,
human capital theory conceptualizes naturalization as an investment
(DeVoretz and Irastorza, 2017), keying “citizenship ascension” to
naturalization’s costs—language learning, fees, and validation of
foreign degrees—and its benefits—the “citizenship premium.”
Research points to the existence of a premium, though
disentangling factors selecting for naturalization from those, net of
selection effects, influencing naturalization’s rewards proves difficult.
In France, naturalization has a powerful, positive effect on
employment, especially among low-educated persons and women,
who are particularly likely to be jobless (Fougère and Safi, 2009). The
brevity of the French residency requirement, increasing the return to
citizenship, as well as the goal of gaining employment to the large
public sector, fromwhich noncitizens are largely barred (Fougère and
Safi, 2009) further add to the motivations to naturalize; however, the
length, complications, and uncertainty of the naturalization process
work in the opposite direction.
In seeking to control migration, states sift newcomers by legal
status, which further structures options for naturalization. After
the mid-1970s with the end to labor migration, legal entry mainly
occurred via family reunification. Whereas workers or family
members select the destination country as the target of migration,
the destination country selects a small fraction of the world’s
displaced for permanent residence; in choosing refugees or
asylum-seekers, states subject them to close vetting, which also
signals their deservingness.
Thus, prior research yields conflicting views regarding the
channels linking individual characteristics to naturalization
outcomes. While exposure should increase knowledge about
acquisition, the longer the time spent without citizenship, the
lower the pay-off. Likewise, naturalization may do most for the
lowest skilled, a motivation possibly offset by difficulties encountered
by poorly educated migrants navigating a complex. Less clear are
implications for determinants of the naturalization track. As
suggested earlier, characteristics at the relationship-, rather than
individual-, level are likely to be the more important. Nonetheless,
as allaying doubt is likely to ease suspicion, other sources of
legitimacy—higher levels of education, entry with authorization,
and refugee status—may favor naturalization via the faster track.
Contextual-Level Approaches: Country of Emigration
Effects1
Naturalization involves a strategic decision, weighing the costs and
benefits of the citizenship of the country of emigration against those
of the country of immigration. Thus, immigrants from countries
where political institutions function poorly should be more likely to
naturalize, as the costs of citizenship loss are lower than for those
from well-functioning democracies. Similarly, countries differ
significantly in the degree to which their passports open doors
internationally. The French passport has great utility as a travel
document, providing visa-free access to 175 countries, in contrast to
56 for a Senegalese passport and only 47 for an Algerian passport.2
These considerations bear on the practical consequences of
citizenship acquisition; other home country characteristics affect
symbolic dimensions. Naturalization entails a transfer of national
loyalties; prior socialization for membership in the home country
people may impede that shift, as illustrated by the widespread belief
among Latin American immigrants in the United States that the
naturalization ceremony entails stomping on the home country flag
(Jones-Correa, 1998). The historically fraught relationship between
France and its former colonies, and Algeria in particular, may
similarly lead the acquisition of French citizenship to be seen as
an act of betrayal (Sayad, 1993; Beaud, 2018).
Beyond specific dyadic histories, a more general home country
trait—the strength of national identity—can influence
naturalization propensities. According to an analysis of the
MGIS, “the more the national tie is perceived a strong
affective tie, the more the change in nationality is a difficult
decision to take and the fewer are those who take the step”
(Tribalat, 1996, 168). Yet for immigrants frommulti-ethnic states
in sub-Saharan or central Africa where a strong national identity
has not congealed, loyalty to the country left behind may be
largely irrelevant.
Policies allowing dual citizenship canmitigate the loyalty problem,
releasing immigrants to accept a second citizenship (Mazzolari,
2009). Since France accepts dual citizenship, sending country
variation in dual citizenship policies are likely to matter, leading
immigrants from countries that permit dual citizenship to be more
likely to acquire receiving country citizenship than those that do not.
Overall, a disadvantaged context of origin should yield both
material and symbolic advantages to naturalization, and hence
motivate immigrants to acquire a new citizenship. Yet for
precisely these reasons, background in a more disadvantaged
1The literature also draws attention to the relevance of country of immigration
effects. In separate analysis, available upon request, we ran analyses including two
such measures: one measuring support for the extreme right-wing party, Front
Natonal, at the regional level, hypothesizing that naturalization probabilities will be
lower where the party enjoys a high level of support; and a second measuring
average educational achievement by national origin, hypothesizing that higher
group-level resources will be associated with higher naturalization probabilities. As
neither variable yields effects on naturalization by marriage nor affects other
independent variables of interest, we dropped this discussion for reasons of
concision.
2Data drawn from the passport index https://www.passportindex.org [accessed
August 21, 2017].
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context of origin might cast doubt on the legitimacy of efforts to
pursue naturalization along the faster track.
DATA AND METHODS
Data come from the Trajectories and Origins (TeO) survey produced
by INED/INSEE in 2008–2009 on a sample of over 21,000 respondents
aged 18–60 years living in metropolitan France (Beauchemin et al.,
2018). TeO overrepresents minority populations to ensure adequate-
sized national origin subgroups.3 The survey includes detailed
information on migratory trajectories, citizenship, and the type and
timing of naturalization. Variables on respondents’ parents, spouses,
and children shed further light on the family context.
We further enrich the TeO survey by matching respondents
with information on their country of origin compiled from a
variety of sources. This allows us to disentangle individual and
family-level variables from country-level factors that influence
the propensity to naturalize.
Sample
Our analysis focuses on the immigrant population only who are
either foreign or naturalized at the time of the survey.4 In France,
immigrants are defined as foreign-born respondents without
French citizenship at birth. There are 8,253 immigrants in
TeO. As migrants only become eligible for naturalization after
5 years of residency, we exclude those who arrived in the 5 years
prior to the survey date (N  708, or 9% of all immigrants). To
enable matching with country of origin characteristics, the sample
is further restricted tomigrants whose country of birth is reported
in detail. This results in a sample of 6,411 migrants with 51
different national origins.5
Modeling Strategy
There are two pathways to French citizenship6: acquisition
through declaration and acquisition by decree. Naturalization
through declaration is reserved for the spouses of French
citizens. For clarity, we refer to this naturalization route as
“naturalization through marriage.” Naturalization by decree
is the more common track open to eligible foreigners. Out of
the total 6,411 migrants in our sample, 35% naturalized by
decree and 7% became French citizens by marriage (Table 1).
The median time to naturalization was 11 years after arriving
in France, but those who gained citizenship through marriage
naturalized faster than those who naturalized by decree.
Due to the two-track naturalization system, our analysis
employs a logistic discrete-time hazard model for multiple
absorbing events. This estimation strategy is appropriate for
event history analysis with two or more modes of failure,
namely, naturalization by decree or naturalization by
marriage7 (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008). We fit the
model using a multinomial design into order to determine
whether the independent variables shape the risk of
naturalizing in different ways according to the track, with
three possible outcomes: never naturalized, naturalized by
decree, and naturalized through marriage. While the latter is
only open to migrants with French spouses, all respondents
are at risk of marrying over the period and then naturalizing
by this route.8 Data were restructured into a person/year
format, with each respondent having one observation for
every year during which she is at risk of acquiring
citizenship (N  111,597). The observations begin the year
respondents migrated and end once one of the naturalization
events (or censoring) has occurred.
We built Model 1 including all individual, family, and
contextual variables, selecting covariates measured prior to the
naturalization event, or when the data allow, which vary over
time. Table 2 provides summary statistics on all independent
variables, described below. We interpret the model results as
marginal effects of naturalizing in a given year by each track,
holding all other values constant using Stata’smargins command.
Due to repeated individual observations, the model is estimated
TABLE 1 | Naturalization rates and timing.
N Weighted %
Naturalized by decree 2,373 35
Naturalized through marriage 461 7
Foreign 3,577 58
Total 6,411 100
— Years from arrival
Median time to citizenship 11
Via decree 13
Via marriage 7
3All descriptive analyses apply appropriate sampling weights.
4While some second-generation immigrants born in France without French
citizenship are also at risk of naturalizing, we exclude these respondents from
our analysis as their citizenship acquisition is governed by a specific jus solis
procedure.
5TeO provides precise national origins for most groups. However, when sample
sizes are small, certain origins are aggregated into larger categories (i.e. other Asia)
and detailed country of origin is not provided; these respondents are excluded from
the analysis. We included migrants from the following countries: Algeria, Morocco,
Tunisia, Senegal, Mauritania, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso,
Niger, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Gabon, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of Congo,
Equatorial Guinea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Turkey, Portugal, Spain, Italy,
Greece, Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden, Finland,
United Kingdom, Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Czech Republic, Romania, Slovenia,
and Slovakia.
6Excluding cases of jus sanguinis, for people with French filiation.
7We opt for logistic discrete time models over Cox proportional hazard models
because we lack a fine-grained measure of the date of naturalization, only the year
in which it occurred. Logistic discrete timemodels are also preferable when the data
have many ties, i.e. many individuals are experiencing the event at the same time
(Allison, 1982).
8Because naturalization by marriage concerns a selected population, we ran two
additional models: a model restricting the sample to respondents who are or were
ever married, and a Heckman probit model where the selection equation predicts
whether respondents are or were ever married. Findings and details on these
models are presented in Table A2 in the Appendix. The main findings relating to
the origin of the spouse are robust to these specifications.
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using clustered standard errors at the individual level. We further
replicated this model on a sample excluding European migrants
(Model 2). Given free movement and residence within the
European Union since 1992, Europeans may have a lower
incentive to naturalize. We therefore ensure that our findings
are not driven by this category of migrants.
Next, we aimed to assess the relative influence of
individual, family, and contextual variables on the
likelihood of naturalizing by both tracks. We calculated
predicted probabilities of naturalizing over time for
migrants with “advantaged” vs. “disadvantaged” individual,
family, and contextual characteristics. We define advantage
and disadvantage empirically, based on the variables
identified in Model 1 as favoring or impeding the
likelihood of naturalization. Individual-level advantage is a
migrant belonging to the G1.75 generation with the highest






Language ability Spoke French during childhood (dummy) 0.31






2-Year university degree 0.07
Higher education 0.16
Employment status Period(s) of unemployment since arrival (dummy) 0.22






Issuance of residency card Card issued after arrival (dummy) 0.17
Migration trajectories Migration to France before arrival (dummy) 0.18




Parental religion Father or mother religious 0.93




Children Number of children born in France 1.68
Number of children born abroad 0.40
Parents’ location Not in France/unknown 0.57
At least one parent arrived before R 0.30
At least one parent arrived with or after R 0.13
Spousal characteristics Origin
No partner 0.36
Spouse is a French native with French native parents 0.15
Spouse is French native with immigrant parent(s) 0.07
Spouse is a naturalized French citizen 0.13
Spouse is foreign-born 0.29
More than 7 years age difference between spouses 0.20
Premigration marriage outside of France 0.19
Contextual-level variables
Country of origin Polity score 0.37
Citizenship loss in origin country (dummy) 0.39
Former colony (dummy) 0.55
Passport power 0.44
Ethnic fractionalization 0.34
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level of education. Individual-level disadvantage is a G1
migrant with no education. Family-level advantage refers to
migrants with parents having the highest level of education,
children and parents located in France, a spouse born in
France to French-born parents (in the case of the marriage
track), or a naturalized French spouse (in the case of the
decree track). Disadvantage on family characteristics refers to
migrants with parents lacking any education, children and
parents not located in France, and having no spouse or a
foreign spouse. We applied the same procedure to contextual
characteristics to obtain predicted probabilities of
naturalizing between migrants from advantaged contexts
(strong polity, dual citizenship laws, strong passport power,
not a former colony, and low ethnic fractionalization) and
disadvantaged contexts (weak polity, no dual citizenship laws,
low passport power, former colony, and high ethnic
fractionalization).9 All other values were held constant.
Finally, we identified whether certain individual or contextual
characteristics interact with the origin of the spouse in important
ways for naturalization pathways, introducing interactions into
the main model, described below.
Family-Level Variables
Origin of the Spouse
Using the year of marriage and details on the origin of the spouse,
we constructed a categorical measure of marital status. This
measurement varies over time during the period at risk, so
that we can chronologically ascertain the relationship between
marriage and naturalization. About 70% of migrants in the
sample are married, most of whom have an immigrant spouse,
either naturalized (13%) or foreign (29%). 15% are married to
French natives and 7% are married to French-born, second-
generation immigrants. In the models, we group the “no
spouse” and “foreign spouse” categories together.
Location and Timing of Marriage
For married respondents, we distinguished between migrants
based on the location and timing of the marriage with a
dummy variable: 1 for migrants married outside of France
prior to migration and 0 otherwise.
Age Difference Between Spouses
We used a dummy capturing age differences between spouses,
coded 1 if the spouses have a more than 7 years age difference and
0 otherwise.
Children
We identified whether respondents’ children were born in France
or abroad. These variables are time-varying based on the year of
birth, indicating the cumulative number of children born in
France or abroad during the time at risk. On average, the
sample shows more children born in France than abroad.
Parental Characteristics
TeO includes information on whether respondents’ parents have
migrated to France and, if so, the time of their migration. We
distinguished among parent(s) arriving before the migrant (30%);
parent(s) arriving with or after the migrant (13%); and parent(s)
not living in France at the end of the period at risk or whose place
of residence is unknown (57%). We also included the educational
level of respondents’ parents. As shown in Table 2, about two-
thirds of respondents have parents with no education. Finally, we
controlled for a dummy indicating whether either the mother or
the father was religious.10
Individual-Level Variables
Immigrant Generation
We constructed a 4-level immigrant generation variable based on
age at migration. The G1 generation refers to migrants who
arrived after the age of 17 years, G1.25 to those who arrived
between the ages of 12 and 17 years, G1.5 to those who migrated
between 6 and 11 years, and G1.75 generation to those who
arrived as young children before 6 years of age.11 The large
majority of the sample are G1 immigrants.
Language
A dummy indicates whether respondents spoke French during
childhood (about one-third of the sample).
Education and Employment
We used an 8-level categorical measure of respondent’s education
and the year of completed education. This measure varies over
time during the period at risk. Levels of education are relatively
low: Two-thirds did not obtain a high school diploma. A dummy
indicates whether the respondent was ever unemployed during
the time to naturalization (22% of the sample were at some point
unemployed).
Legal status upon arrival is measured using information about
the type of residency card and its date of acquisition. A categorical
variable distinguishes among 6 statuses: refugees, students,
workers, family reunification/French spouse, waiver, or other/
unknown. A dummy indicates whether the first residency card
was obtained after the year of migration, which would delay
eligibility for citizenship. Most migrants arrived via family
reunification (36%) or as workers (21%); 17% received a
residency card late, that is, after their first year in France.
Migratory Trajectories
Two dummies capture migratory trajectories: Migration before
arrival indicates a stay in France prior to arrival; migration after
9We set the contextual characteristics at the minimum and maximum values;
results also replicate when we use the 25th and 75th percentile values.
10The available data only contain parental religiosity but do not report parental
religion.
11Somemigrants who arrived in France as children may have naturalized before the
age of 18 years, specifically if one of their parent(s) naturalized. To ensure that our
results are not sensitive to these early naturalizations, we ran models excluding
these respondents. 6% of the sample naturalized as minors (N  418). Results do
not change substantially when these respondents are dropped, with the exception
that the effects of generation and parental education on naturalization by decree
become insignificant.
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arrival indicates whether respondents had spent at least 1 year
outside of France after arrival. 18% of the sample had been in
France prior to immigration; 7% had lived in another country
after immigrating.
Demographics
All models further control for gender, year, and year-squared.12
Given that we control for age at migration and that the clock
starts upon arrival, the year variables can be interpreted as an
effect of age on naturalization propensities.
Contextual-Level Variables
Naturalization decisions are also influenced by the rights migrants
stand to gain or lose by acquiring a new citizenship, a decision-
making process which likely varies by country of origin. TeO reports
the specific country of origin of migrants as well as their year of
migration. This allows us to merge the TeO survey with additional
data sources to retrieve contextual indicators relative to the country of
origin at the time of migration to France.
Polity Score
We assigned each TeO respondent a polity score based on the
relative strength of democracy in their country of origin. This
variable comes from the Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers,
2002) which ranks countries over time, allowing us to match
respondents based on their country of origin and time of
migration. The scale ranges from −10 (weak) to 10 (strong).
We rescaled the variable from 0 to 1.
Ethnic Fractionalization
This variable comes from the Quality of Government Basic
dataset (Dahlberg et al., 2021) and measures the strength of
national cohesion in the country of origin. These data are also
available over time, allowing us to match the information to TeO
at the time of migration. Specifically, it measures the probability
that two randomly selected individuals are not from the same
ethnic group. Respondents tend to come from countries with
somewhat weak polities on average (mean  0.37) and moderate
ethnic fractionalization (mean  0.34).
Passport Power
Henley and Partners 2018 Passport Index ranks the visa-free
travel freedoms provided by all countries, ranging from 1 (weak)
to 91 (strong). We reversed the original scale so that higher values
indicate greater passport power. As these data are current
measurements and are not available over time, this
measurement does not vary according to the time of
migration. However, it is unlikely that countries’ passport
power have changed substantially over time. We rescaled the
variable from 0 to 1. The sample mean is 0.44, indicating
moderate passport power in migrants’ countries of origin.
Citizenship Loss
We matched the TeO survey with the MACMIDE Global
Expatriate Dual Citizenship Dataset (Vink et al., 2015)
documenting dual citizenship policies for 200 countries since
1960. We created a dummy indicating whether the naturalization
of a TeO respondent would have resulted in citizenship loss based
on their country of origin. This variable was measured at the time
of arrival in France. 39% of the sample were at risk of losing
citizenship upon naturalizing in France.
Origins in Former Colonies
We recoded the country of origin variable reported in TeO into a
dummy to indicate whether migrants emanate from a former
French colony. This is true of about half of all respondents.
RESULTS
Table 3 shows naturalization rates according to individual, family,
and contextual variables. Family characteristics are decisive to
acquiring citizenship. Marriage is tightly intertwined with
naturalization: As of the survey, only about one-third of
unpartnered migrants possessed French citizenship.13 The origin
and citizenship status of the respondent’s spouse produce the
greatest variation in naturalization rates. 79 percent of
respondents married to a naturalized French citizen are also
naturalized, although most had obtained French citizenship by
decree, not through marriage. While naturalization rates were
lower among persons married to French-born children of French-
born parents, naturalization via marriage was particularly common.
By contrast, only 15 percent of respondents married to noncitizen,
foreign-born persons had acquired French nationality.
The location of parents and children in France also matter to
the likelihood of naturalizing. 65% of respondents whose parents
migrated at the same time or after the respondent naturalized
compared to 33%whose parents are not in France. Having at least
one child born in France is associated with higher naturalization
rates, while having children abroad is linked with lower chances
of naturalizing.
Naturalization also varies greatly by individual characteristics,
particularly age at arrival, education, and legal status. 63 percent
of G1.75 and 57 percent of G1.5 respondents were naturalized
(mainly via decree) as opposed to only 31 percent of those
respondents who had arrived in France as adults. Respondents
with the highest level of education were more likely to have
gained citizenship than respondents who never went beyond
primary school (49 percent vs. 32 percent), although higher
levels of citizenship were actually obtained by persons with a
2 year university degree (55 percent). Status upon entry was a
source of differences of comparable size, as 57 percent of persons
12We also ran the model controlling for dummies for each year. Results are robust
to this specification.
13Table 3 shows that a small percentage of unpartnered migrants naturalized by
marriage. These respondents are predominately ex-spouses of French citizens. As
we do not have the date of divorce/separation, we cannot chronologically order this
event with respect to naturalization. However, given the small number of
respondents concerned, it is unlikely that this substantially influences the findings.
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TABLE 3 | Naturalization rates by individual and contextual characteristics.
% Not naturalized % Naturalization by decree % Naturalized via marriage
Individual-level variables
Generation
G1 migrated after 17 years 69 23 8
G1.25 migrated at 12–17 years 54 40 6
G1.5 migrated at 6–11 years 43 51 6
G1.75 migrated at 0–5 years 37 59 4
R’s language during childhood
Foreign 62 31 7
French 50 43 7
R’s education
No education 65 29 6
Primary schooling 68 27 5
Middle school 60 34 6
Vocational degree 51 42 7
Bac pro 47 46 7
Bac general 58 35 7
2-Year university degree 45 46 9
Higher education 51 39 10
R experienced unemployment after arrival
No 59 34 7
Yes 53 39 8
Residency card
Asylum 43 51 6
Student 52 36 12
Worker 73 23 4
Family reunion or married French citizen 59 32 9
Waiver 60 34 6
Other/missing 46 48 5
Residency card issued after arrival
No 57 36 7
Yes 62 31 8
Migration prior to arrival
No 56 38 7
Yes 68 22 9
Migration after arrival
No 57 36 7
Yes 68 25 7
Gender
Male 59 35 5
Female 57 35 9
Family-level variables
R’s parents’ education
No education 59 35 6
Primary/middle 54 38 8
Bac 57 34 9
University 59 32 9
Number of children born in France
None 65 31 4
1, 2 56 35 9
3 or more 53 39 8
Number of children born abroad
None 55 38 7
1, 2 69 23 8
3 or more 81 17 2
R’s parents’ location
Unknown/not in France 67 25 8
At least one parent arrived before R 51 43 5
At least one parent arrived with or after R 35 57 8
Origin of spouse
No partner 61 36 3
Spouse is French native with French parents 37 39 23
(Continued on following page)
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admitted as asylum-seekers but only 27 percent of those who
entered as workers had obtained citizenship as of the survey.
Contextual indicators are not as salient to naturalization
patterns relative to family- and individual-level variables. The
polity scale captured the widest differences: French citizenship
had been obtained by only 30 percent of respondents originating
in those states at or above the 50th percentile, as opposed to 54
percent among respondents from states at the 25th – 50th
percentile and 51 percent among respondents from states at
the 25th percentile or lower.
We ran a logistic discrete-timemodel with competing risks to test
these individual, family, and contextual factors net of other factors.
Results in Table A1 in the Appendix show the marginal effects of
naturalizing in a given year by each track, separately for the full
sample ofmigrants (Model 1) as well as for non-EUmigrants (Model
2). To facilitate interpretation of the findings, we report the effects of
individual, family, and contextual variables separately inFigures 1–3.
The results again highlight the importance of family
characteristics (Figure 1), yet in contrasting ways according to
the type of naturalization. Prior marriage to a French citizen
promotes naturalization; this variable exerts the largest effect
compared to all other covariates. However, the origin of the
spouse plays out differently for naturalization by decree and
naturalization by marriage. The probability of naturalizing by
decree is highest for those with naturalized French spouses,
whereas those married to natives (i.e., France-born spouses,
born to France-born parents) are more likely to opt for the
naturalization by marriage route. Marriages that occurred
prior to migration outside of France negatively influence the
likelihood of naturalizing by both tracks. A large age difference
between the spouses does not, however, seem to matter. The
location and education of parents also proves to be a significant
predictor of naturalization. Migrants whose parents live abroad
are less likely to naturalize than those with parents settled in
France. Higher parental education also positively influences
becoming French, although this variable only exercises
influence on naturalization by decree.
Individual-level characteristics also have potent effects on
naturalization but contribute more heavily to the
naturalization by decree track (Figure 2). Very few individual
variables matter to naturalization by marriage. Higher education
accelerates access to French citizenship via both routes, although
impacts are greater on naturalization by decree than by marriage.
Immigrant generation matters to naturalization by decree, but is
not decisive to naturalization via marriage net of other factors.
Gender does not yield significant effects on naturalization by
decree, yet women prove more likely to naturalize via marriage
than men. Legal status upon arrival is also decisive for
naturalization by decree, but neither legal status nor the
timing of the first residency card affects citizenship through
marriage.
Last, contextual variables play a minor role. Disadvantaged
country of origin characteristics typically result in higher
naturalization, but only the polity score–with those from more
TABLE 3 | (Continued) Naturalization rates by individual and contextual characteristics.
% Not naturalized % Naturalization by decree % Naturalized via marriage
Spouse is French native with immigrant parent(s) 44 35 21
Spouse is naturalized French 21 73 6
Spouse is foreign-born 85 15 <1
Age difference between spouses
Yes 57 33 10
No 58 35 6
Premigration marriage
Yes 72 22 6
No 55 38 7
Contextual-level variables
Citizenship loss
No 57 36 7
Yes 59 33 8
Former colony
No 65 28 7
Yes 52 41 7
Polity score
<25th 49 45 6
25th–50th 45 44 10
>50th 70 24 7
Passport power
<25th 52 41 7
25th–50th 52 40 8
>50th 64 29 7
Ethnic fractionalization
<25th 66 27 7
25th–50th 55 39 6
>50th 54 39 8
Table shows row percentages.
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democratic polities less likely to obtain citizenship–yields any
impact on naturalization by marriage.14
The majority of these findings are robust to the exclusion
of Europeans (Model 2, Table A1). What’s more, the family
and individual correlates of naturalization tend to be slightly
stronger for non-European origins. Still, there are some
notable differences with respect to Model 1. Immigrant
generation is significantly related to naturalization by
marriage for the non-European sample. Compared to
migrants who arrived as adults (G1), migrants who
arrived in childhood (G1.75 and G1.5) are less likely to
opt for the marriage track. Non-European migrants who
entered with a family reunification visa are also more likely
to naturalize by marriage, suggesting that non-European
migrants may more often draw on a pre-migration
marriage with a French citizen to gain legal entry. Finally,
not all contextual variables matter in the same way: The
polity score loses significance among the non-European
sample, whereas originating from a former French colony
positively impacts naturalization via both routes.
To test the relative weight of individual, family, and
contextual variables, Figures 4,5 plot the predicted
probabilities of naturalizing by decree and by marriage,
respectively, based on disadvantaged and advantaged sets
of characteristics. As Figure 4 shows, the probability of
naturalization by decree is low in the early years following
migration and then increases over time. Individual factors
are powerful: After 26 years of residence in France, a 10
percentage point gap in the probability of naturalizing
separates individuals with advantaged vs. disadvantaged
characteristics. Yet, family advantage is an even more
potent predictor, increasing the likelihood of obtaining
citizenship by about 20 percentage points over 26 years.
On the other hand, context plays a very small role, with
minor differences between disadvantaged and advantaged
contexts, and a contrasting pattern of impact: Migrants from
disadvantaged contexts naturalize at higher rates than those
from advantaged contexts.
As Figure 5 demonstrates, the likelihood of acquiring
citizenship via marriage follows a different trend. Probabilities
of naturalizing soon after migration are high and then decline as
years in France increase, likely due to the fact that some migrants
come to France with the intention to marry and naturalize
quickly. In this naturalization procedure, family advantage
again outweighs all other factors. While differences between
individual and contextual variables are negligible, migrants
with advantageous family characteristics have a 5 percentage
point greater likelihood of naturalizing at the beginning of
the period than migrants with disadvantaged family
characteristics.
Finally, we aimed to assess whether the benefit of having
a French spouse plays out similarly for men and women and
FIGURE 1 |Marginal effects of family variables on naturalization fromModel 1. Note: Reference categories for categorical covariates are as follows: origin of spouse
(ref: no partner or foreign spouse); parental education (ref: no education); location of parents (ref: parent(s) not in France or unknown).
14We also estimated amodel using clustered standard errors at the country of origin
level. This did not alter the estimates of the individual and family-level variables.
Some of the contextual variables lose significance. Disadvantaged country-of-
origin characteristics are not significantly correlated to naturalization by degree.
However, we still find a negative significant effect of the polity score on
naturalization by marriage. We do not include this model for sake of
concision, but the results are available upon request.
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across country of origin characteristics. Some groups may be
more susceptible to administrative scrutiny during the
naturalization process, particularly when naturalizing by
marriage. We introduced two sets of interactions into the
model: 1) between gender and spousal origin and 2) between
migrant origin in a former colonial country and spousal origin.
FIGURE 3 | Marginal effects of contextual variables on naturalization from Model 1.
FIGURE 2 |Marginal effects of individual variables on naturalization from Model 1. Note: Reference categories for categorical covariates are as follows: generation
(ref: G1); education (ref: no education); residence permit (ref: asylum).
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Figure 6 presents the gender and spousal origin interaction.15
Results suggest that women who are married to French
native citizens with French parents appear to take the
naturalization via marriage track to a greater degree than
men. The interaction between former colonial country and
spousal origin, however, did not produce significant results
and is not shown here.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
As Brubaker (1992) famously demonstrated, citizenship entails
social closure. As an object of closure, citizenship is surrounded
by obstacles that make its attainment elusive, even for resident
non-foreigners who might enact and experience everyday
citizenship. As an instrument of closure, citizenship generates
inequalities between citizens and foreigners residing on the
citizens’ territory. As a bias toward the familial ties of citizens
characterizes both migration and naturalization policies, citizens’
own decisions to marry foreigners undermine states’ capacity to
close off both territory and membership. Yet precisely because
FIGURE 4 | Predicted probabilities of naturalizing by decree according to changes in individual, family, and contextual variables.
FIGURE 5 | Predicted probabilities of naturalizing by marriage according to changes in individual, family, and contextual variables.
15Model results including interactions are available upon request.
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they represent the weak link in migration, the intimate ties
between citizens and foreigners as institutionalized through
marriage have increasingly become the focus of suspicion.
This study, drawing on the French Trajectories and Origins
Survey, a rich, large-sample data set, has sought to build on earlier
research demonstrating how family factors influence citizenship
attainment. In doing so, we have also gone beyond that research,
leveraging a distinctive trait of French naturalization policy to
illuminate the factors allowing eligible immigrants to take
advantage of fast-track procedures that facilitate naturalization
for the spouses of citizens. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the quantitative first empirical study to address this question.
Confirming prior scholarship, the study has shown that for the
standard naturalization track—naturalization by
decree—differences in citizenship take-up rates are strongly
keyed to individual-level resources (Yang, 1994; Carrillo,
2015). Immigrants whose exposure to France started in
childhood are more likely to naturalize than those who arrived
later in life. Naturalization propensities rise with levels of
education, although the main effects are felt at the high end of
the spectrum, reflecting the stringencies of the process. Possessing
a residency card at the moment of entry hastens passage toward
citizenship; admission as a refugee or asylum-seeker is a still
stronger accelerant. Migrant trajectories are also linked to
naturalization decisions, with persons who remigrated after
first arriving in France less likely to become citizens. While
our analysis excludes by design persons who have permanently
remigrated and cannot be observed, this finding indicates that
migrants who stay in the sample are positively selected. By
contrast, results for the standard track provide limited
reinforcement for the importance of context. Country-of-
origin effects on the standard track are keyed to disadvantage:
Immigrants from countries that are less democratic and have
passports that open fewer doors are more likely to naturalize,
although these influences have very modest effects.
While these results largely confirm prior research, the study’s
emphasis on the importance of family-level characteristics and,
especially, its attention to the relevance of institutional factors
yields new insight. Family-level traits prove even more powerful,
in their effects on standard naturalization (naturalization by
decree), than the individual-level characteristics to which
previous scholarship has attended. By contrast, family-level
influence almost entirely drives naturalization by marriage.
More importantly, we demonstrated that marriage to French
citizens is the single most powerful factor, yielding effects on
naturalization in both tracks. While couple formation is a social
process, marriage entails a relationship to the state, which is why
the very definition of marriage and its uses for the purposes of
regulating immigration are instances of social closure. Like
many other states of immigration, France grants the spouses
of citizens greater access to citizenship, a pattern of exceptional
treatment that has paradoxically made those marriages all the
more suspect. The fact that only marriage allows potential
citizens to access the marriage track at a time when other
forms of nonmarital union are both increasingly common
and state-sanctioned testifies to the social closure that
surrounds citizenship and the distinctively political
impediments to formal membership in the people.
Most of the married immigrant respondents were married to
French citizens; nonetheless, usage of the marriage track proves
uneven among those married to French citizens prior to
naturalization. Most eligible persons forgo this route; the
citizen spouse’s parentage proves to be the decisive factor in
determining which option to choose. By contrast, a core
assimilation variable such as generation bears no relationship
to usage of the marriage track and education is barely influential
with impacts only at the very highest end.
Here, we see the combination of the political and the social,
reflecting the linkage between the status and identity dimensions
of citizenship. Legally, naturalization by marriage is a right
possessed by all immigrants with a citizen spouse; some
immigrants do indeed exercise that right, but only if they have
the right type of spouse, as indicated by the weak, almost
negligible effects associated with individual and contextual
factors. As persons choosing the marriage track have to
comply with the extensive requirements needed to
demonstrate the “truth” of their marriage, it is not surprising
FIGURE 6 | Interaction between gender and the origin of the spouse.
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that the marriage option is far more likely to be selected by
immigrants married to French citizens of French ancestry, as
opposed to their counterparts with a naturalized citizen spouse,
whose immediate foreign origin may be a source of suspicion.
Likewise, our finding that women are more likely to use the
marriage track than men suggests that the same shadow that
makes the migration of foreign men married to citizens
suspect—as well documented in the literature—extends to the
naturalization sphere as well—which has not been
previously shown.
In the end, naturalization is linked to states’monopolization of
the means of admissions, a process which includes their
monopoly over the means of mobility, as Torpey (2018) has
emphasized, but extends to their monopoly of what Walzer
(1983) called “second admissions,” namely, naturalization.
Controls at the first level discourage many would-be
immigrants, but not quite as many as rich democracies like
France would like, which is why leakage across the frontier
always occurs. But errors or oversights at the first level can be
corrected at the second level, as the techniques that suffice for
entering the territory have no traction on naturalization, a sphere
that is the province of the state alone. As foreigners’ entry into
citizenship gives them a permanent place in the national
landscape while also entailing easier first admissions for their
relatives still living at home, the inherent connection between
immigration and naturalization leads citizenship to be an
increasingly elusive prize.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1 | Marginal Effects of Naturalizing by Both Tracks (Models 1 and 2)
Model 1 Model 2










Year 0.002*** −0.000*** 0.003*** −0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year squared −0.000*** 0.000 −0.000*** 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Generation/Ref: G1
G1.25 0.008*** −0.000 0.011*** −0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
G1.5 0.008*** −0.000 0.008** −0.002*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
G1.75 0.011*** −0.001 0.012*** −0.004***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
R spoke French during childhood 0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
R’s education/Ref: No education
Primary −0.001 0.001 −0.003 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Middle 0.001 0.003** 0.002 0.003**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Vocational −0.002 0.002** −0.003† 0.002†
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Professional bac 0.009* 0.003* 0.012* 0.004†
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
General bac 0.004† 0.002* 0.006† 0.003**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
2-Year university degree 0.011*** 0.003* 0.015** 0.005**
(0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002)
Higher education 0.010*** 0.003*** 0.017*** 0.005***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
R experienced unemployment after arrival -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Residency card on arrival/Ref: Refugee
Student −0.012*** 0.001 −0.017*** 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Worker -0.017*** -0.001 -0.021*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Family reunification −0.014*** 0.001 −0.017*** 0.003**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Exemption −0.013*** 0.001 −0.017*** 0.002
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002)
Other/unknown 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.001
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Residency card issued after first year of arrival −0.002† −0.000 −0.004* 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Migration before arrival −0.001 −0.000 0.002 0.002*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Migration after arrival −0.010*** −0.001 −0.012** −0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Female 0.002† 0.003*** 0.002 0.002**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Family-level variables
Marital status/Ref: No partner or foreign partner
Spouse is French native with French parents 0.017*** 0.041*** 0.017*** 0.041***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
(Continued on following page)
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TABLE A1 | (Continued) Marginal Effects of Naturalizing by Both Tracks (Models 1 and 2)
Model 1 Model 2









Spouse is French native with immigrant parent(s) 0.024*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.024***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Spouse is naturalized French 0.059*** 0.006*** 0.063*** 0.006***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Married before migration −0.006*** −0.002*** −0.008*** −0.002*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
More than 7 years of age difference between
spouses
−0.000 0.000 −0.002 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Cumulative number of children born in France −0.002*** −0.001* −0.002** −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Cumulative number of children born abroad −0.002* −0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
R’s parents’ education/Ref: No education
Primary or middle 0.005*** −0.000 0.008*** −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Bac 0.006** 0.000 0.008* 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
University 0.009*** 0.000 0.013*** -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Parents’ location/Ref: Parents’ not in France or
unknown
Parent(s) arrived in France before R −0.000 −0.001* −0.003 −0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Parent(s) arrived with or after R 0.006*** 0.002† 0.006* 0.004*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Mother or father religious −0.003 0.000 −0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Contextual-level variables
Polity score −0.004* −0.004*** 0.005 −0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Citizenship loss −0.002† 0.001 −0.004† -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Former colony 0.001 0.002 0.007* 0.004*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Passport power −0.013*** 0.002 −0.016† 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.009) (0.004)
Ethnic fractionalization 0.006* 0.000 0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002)
Observations 100,194 100,194 60,966 60,966
Standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.10
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TABLE A2 | Robustness Tests of the Origin of the Spouse Effect
Basic Model 1 Restricted to respondents who














Ref: No partner/foreign partner
Spouse is French native with French parents 0.792*** 3.679*** 0.780*** 3.425*** 0.324*** 0.769**
(0.102) (0.166) (0.104) (0.168) (0.041) (0.289)
Spouse is French native with immigrant parent(s) 0.975*** 3.312*** 0.988*** 3.070*** 0.429*** 0.694**
(0.118) (0.187) (0.119) (0.186) (0.051) (0.258)
Spouse is naturalized French 1.635*** 1.839*** 1.654*** 1.613*** 0.747*** 0.311*
(0.059) (0.191) (0.059) (0.188) (0.029) (0.129)
N 100,194 100,194 82,348 82,348 100,194 100,194
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.10
Table shows coefficients. All models control for the same set of covariates included in Model 1. The selection equation of the Heckman probit models predicts whether the respondent is or
was ever married and includes the following covariates: year, year squared, generation, language spoken during childhood, educational level, unemployment, gender, and parental
education.
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